A Car Is Not a Pirate Ship

It’s hard to know whether to laugh or cry at the Supreme Court’s 5-4 decision on March 4 upholding the state of Michigan’s forfeiture of Tina Bennis’ half-interest in a family car.

Her offense was… well, nothing. Her husband was the offender. He had been caught in their car receiving oral sex from a prostitute, while parked on a Detroit street after ending his shift at a steel mill. Mrs. Bennis had been at home, wondering where he was, calling the missing persons bureau.

The Court did not hold that Mrs. Bennis had reason to know of her husband’s sordid little tryst. Nor did it rely on Solicitor General Drew Days III’s incredibly lame assertion (in an amicus brief) that Mrs. Bennis had not done enough to prevent her husband from using their car to betray her. Nor did it question her claim that she had recently paid for most of the $600 car with her own hard-earned money from baby-sitting and other chores.

Rather, the Court held in Bennis v. Michigan that none of this mattered. The state not only could confiscate and sell the car (as Mrs. Bennis conceded), but could use the proceeds of her $300 share to pay its costs and keep any money that might be left over. All this, done under the authority of a state nuisance statute aimed at purging neighborhoods of prostitution, was consistent with due process of law.

This result was dictated, Chief Justice William Rehnquist held for the majority, by some precedents dating back to the era of pirate ships and privateers. Widely regarded (at least until Bennis) as having been undermined by more recent decisions, those anachronistic precedents allow governments to forfeit the interests of innocent owners of properties used for illegal purposes, based on the outmoded legal Fiction that the property is somehow the guilty party.

The Right Way to Curb Fees

Stung by growing interest in an intriguing proposal for curbing contingent fees on early offers of settlement, the personal injury bar and other lawyers have mounted a ferocious counterattack with the approach of California’s March 26 primary election (when the proposal will be on the ballot).

A lot of their arguments have been so crude as to evidence both "the transparent self-interestedness" and "the ineptitude" of some members of the plaintiffs bar, in the words of Professor Stephen Gillers of New York University Law School.

But the debate has also featured some serious and substantive critiques of the proposal-not least by the same Professor Gillers. The hard question is whether these arguments make out a plausible case that it would do more harm than good.

Proposition 202, as it is called-and for which I have tentatively expressed enthusiasm in this column ("Tort Lawyers vs. Consumers," Jan. 29, 1996, Page 23)-would cap contingent fees at 15 percent of any settlement offer made by the defendant within 60 days of a claimant’s demand for compensation; if the claimant rejected the offer, the lawyer would remain free to charge whatever otherwise lawful percentage the claimant agreed to pay of that portion (but only that portion) of any eventual recovery that exceeded the original offer. The proposal would apply in all tort cases except class actions.

Free the Rodney King Judge

Could something good finally come from the brutal, racially charged, videotaped beating of Rodney King that shocked the nation five years ago?

That depends on whether the Supreme Court seizes the opportunity, in two cases that the King beating spawned, to restore some humanity and balance to the federal criminal sentencing process.

The Court could do this by making it clear that in cases like these, which involve extraordinary mitigating circumstances, federal district judges have enough leeway to show convicted defendants some mercy, and to treat them as individuals-rather than as numbers to be crunched through the arcane formulas of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.

The irony is that the defendants appealing for mercy in the cases at hand are Stacey Koon and Laurence Powell, the two former Los Angeles cops who were convicted by a federal jury of violating King’s civil rights. The Court heard arguments in the cases, Koon v. United States and Powell v. United States, on Feb. 20.

Koon and Powell were released from federal confinement last December after serving the 30-month terms (minus time off for good behavior) ordered by U.S. District Judge John Davies. But the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit held that Judge Davies had let the two off far too easily when he granted them "downward departures" that spared them more than half of the 70 to 87 months of imprisonment suggested by the sentencing guidelines. Unless they win their Supreme Court appeals, the ex-cops will apparently have to go back to prison for three more years.

Time of Testing for Kenneth Starr

The most important lawyer in America this year is Kenneth Starr, the Whitewater independent counsel.

Starr has the awesome responsibility of passing the most definitive official judgment that we will get in this election year on whether President Bill Clinton and first lady Hillary Rodham Clinton are lawbreakers, or liars, or both. And it’s time Starr began working at that job full time and resolving the key questions.

This has already taken longer than it needed to, perhaps in part because of Starr’s part-time status. In an era of deep public cynicism about government, it will take consummate skill, wisdom, balance, and attention to detail to bring the investigation to a satisfactory conclusion. And Starr must operate under conditions that won’t make it easy for his work to inspire public confidence:

Starr is a politically active, conservative Republican, former solicitor general with ambitions to return to high office-whether by winning a Supreme Court appointment, by running for the Senate, or otherwise-and thus has an incentive to please the Republican leaders who are now bent on driving President Clinton from office.

Starr has expanded and prolonged an investigation that began more than two years ago, and was proceeding more expeditiously under his predecessor, Robert Fiske Jr. Starr had no prosecutorial experience. And he has continued to make very big bucks working part time for private clients, including a conservative foundation that has also financed some of the president’s most virulent critics, as well as tobacco clients and others that are locked in combat with the Clinton administration on various fronts.

Given all this baggage. Starr must work especially hard to dispel suspicions that his million-dollar-a-month investigation is tainted by a subtler brand of the partisanship than pervades the parallel probe being conducted by Sen. Alfonse D’Amato (R-N.Y).

The Dangers of Judge-Bashing

You may not have realized that the Supreme Court-even after a decade under Chief Justice William Rehnquist-is a liberal "judicial dictatorship" that "has centralized control over every moral, political, social, and economic issue in the country," as part of an "intellectual elite that believes the prevailing social order of middle-class America is deeply flawed, unjust, and irrational."

That’s what Patrick Buchanan has been telling Republican audiences as he campaigns for the presidential nomination. He’s also been asserting that the chief "beneficiaries of the Court’s protection" are "members of various minorities including criminals, atheists, homosexuals, flag burners, illegal immigrants (including terrorists), convicts, and pornographers."

And Republican true believers seem to lap it up, as did those assembled at the Heritage Foundation, in Washington, D.C., for the Jan. 29 Buchanan speech quoted above.

Not to be completely outdone in court-bashing, faltering front-runner Sen. Robert Dole (R-Kan.) declared in his Jan. 23 response to President Bill Clinton’s State of the Union address that "our liberal courts" are "[at] war with our values," so that we must (yet again!) "untie the hands of our police."

Who is he talking about? Sandra Day O’Connor?

Never mind that Republican presidents appointed nearly two-thirds of all 790 federal judges, including seven of the nine Supreme Court justices. Republican presidential aspirants are once again running against the courts, as they have done ever since Richard Nixon’s campaign in the 1968 election.

Tort Lawyers Vs. Consumers

Dear Fellow Attorney,

On March 26, 1996, your future as a lawyer will be at stake! There will be two initiatives on the [California] ballot that will end the tort system as you know it. If passed, they will affect all tort cases and eliminate virtually all cases involving motor vehicles. They are the pure NO FAULT AUTO INSURANCE ACT and the LAWYER CONTINGENT FEE UMYTATION ACT.

… No one will be handling automobile cases if this passes! Even if neither you nor your firm handles such cases, the impact on all attorneys and consumers should be obvious.

[By] drastically reducing the number of filings…[the contingent fee proposal] will effect [sic] everyone in the tort system!

We believe most attorneys in California view those measures as bad for consumers and all others involved in the Civil Justice system.

"All others": Those are the key words in the last sentence of the above excerpts, which come from a mass mailing by the state’s main association of plaintiffs lawyers, the Consumer Attorneys of California (CAOC), formerly the California Trial Lawyers Association.

This mailing has been used to solicit secret PAC contributions from large numbers of business lawyers who represent tort defendants. It is a blatant appeal to the mutual self-interest of lawyers in perpetuating the profits they reap by litigating against one another at their clients’ expense.

The most unusual and salient fact about the tort system in this country is that more than 60 cents of every dollar expended by defendants and insurers goes not to compensate injured plaintiffs, but to pay for transaction costs-led by both sides’ legal fees.

The Sentencing Tail Wagging the Guilt Dog

For the jury, it was a close call whether to find Rene Rodriguez guilty of selling any marijuana at all.

On the third day of deliberations, the jurors told the judge that they were unable to reach a unanimous verdict. But finally, after being given an Allen charge, they brought in a conspiracy conviction. It was apparently based on prosecution evidence implicating Rodriguez in a 10-ounce marijuana sale, together with the judge’s instruction that all the jury had to find to convict was that Rodriguez had conspired to sell a "measurable" amount.

The sentence: life without parole.

How’s that? Rodriguez would have faced only 18 months in prison, increased to 4 1/2 years by his two prior drug convictions, if his sentence had been based on the 10-ounce sale that was proven beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.

What jacked his sentence up to life without parole, under as-early "three strikes and-you’re out" statute enacted by Congress, was a finding by the judge, at the post-verdict sentencing hearing, that Rodriguez had probably conspired to sell more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana, not just 10 ounces.

He probably had. But the judge, Thomas Curran of the U.S. District Court in Milwaukee, did not suggest that this had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, or even by clear and convincing evidence. Nor did the prosecution claim to have that kind of proof.

Rather, under the current federal sentencing regime, the prosecution had to prove only that it was more probable than not that Rodriguez had sold 1,000 kilograms, in order to condemn him to die in prison.

When Separate and Equal Makes Sense

The Supreme Court seems likely to rule this year that the Virginia Military Institute’s long-standing exclusion of women denies them the equal protection of the law. Maybe the Court should.

But the most important thing about the case (United States v. Virginia, set for oral arguments on Jan. 17) is not the future of VMI. It is, rather, the threat to the future of all public single-sex education-and even private single-sex education-posed by the unwise legal doctrines now being urged upon the Court by VMI’s main adversaries.

The Clinton Justice Department and some liberal feminist and civil rights groups are seeking an unprecedented holding that all gender classifications are subject to the same "strict scrutiny" under the equal protection clause as racial classifications.

Such a ruling would (among other things) allow single-sex educational programs only if "narrowly tailored" to serve a "compelling governmental objective." In practice, it would erect a virtually insuperable constitutional barrier to any form of public single-sex education, for men or for women.

And this at a time when evidence is rapidly accumulating that single-sex schools, colleges, and classes within coed institutions bring out the best in many students-especially adolescent girls and college-age women, many of whom flourish in women’s colleges and in all-female math and science classes in coed schools.

Although the Clinton administration feebly denies any agenda to prohibit public (or private) single-sex education, it suggests in the same breath that any single-sex program can be justified only by a "compensatory purpose." That’s code language for an affirmative action, redress-for-past-discrimination, double standard that might allow some single-sex programs for females, but not for males.

Probably Innocent, Almost Executed

Now and then a case comes along that tells us a lot about how close we are coming to executing innocent people in this country, and in substantial numbers-and about what will happen if Congress completes the evisceration of the writ of habeas corpus that is already under way in the Supreme Court.

One such case is that of Missouri death row inmate Lloyd Schlup. It took a revealing turn on Dec. 8, when a federal district judge found Schlup to be probably innocent-in the sense that "no reasonable juror would have convicted [Schlup] in light of the new evidence" now in the records-of the 1984 prison murder of which he was convicted. (Schlup was already in prison for two other crimes of (nonfatal) violence.) The judge found credible the recent testimony of 11 eyewitnesses and two alibi witnesses that Schlup was not even present during the murder.

This holding, by Judge Jean Hamilton of St. Louis (a George Bush appointee), is remarkable in several ways:

• The same Judge Hamilton had previously pushed Schlup down the track toward the death chamber without bothering to hold an evidentiary hearing in an August 1993 decision spurning his habeas appeal and vacating his stay of execution.

• Schlup would probably have been executed years ago if the habeas corpus "reforms" that were passed last year by both the Senate and the House (in somewhat different forms) had been in effect.

• Schlup would surely have been executed by now but for the efforts of his first good lawyer, Sean O’Brien of Kansas City, Mo., who did not get the case until six years after Schlup’s December 1985 conviction-and whom Congress is trying to put out of business.

Why This District Should Be Upheld

The ridiculous-looking, 50-percent black congressional district in Dallas County, Texas, depicted on this page, was drawn in 1991 for the explicit purpose of creating a safe black seat (for one Eddie Bernice Johnson) in Congress.

Its geometry makes it one of the most irregularly shaped congressional districts in the nation, as was pointed out on Dec. 5, when the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in this term’s two big racial-gerrymandering cases.

(They are Bush v. Vera, in which a lower court struck down the Dallas district, along with one majority-black and one majority-Hispanic district in the Houston area, and Shaw v. Hunt, in which a lower court upheld two majority-black districts in North Carolina.)

Justice Sandra Day O’Connor-the swing voter who will almost surely determine the outcome of both cases-sounded like she was itching to strike down most or all of these five districts. But in the case of the Dallas district pictured here (District 30), that would be a mistake.

I don’t like uncouthly shaped, race-based districts either. Nor do I like it when (as here) the weirdness of the shape is largely attributable to the self-serving efforts of politicians to draw safe districts for themselves. But the Dallas district should nonetheless stand.

This is not to say that the Court should give states carte blanche to engage in unrestrained racial gerrymandering to increase minority representation. Nor is it to fault the Court’s June 29,1995, decision (in Miller v. Johnson) striking down as a racial gerrymander a majority-black district that had been improperly forced on the state of Georgia by the Justice Department, in the department’s headlong pursuit of proportional representation at all costs.