The Politics of Hanging Judges
by Stuart Taylor, Jr.
Buried in a little-noticed Feb. 22 decision by the Supreme Court is an illuminating statistic. It speaks volumes-although the Court pretended otherwise-about the incapacity of many elected state judges, in the current climate, to do justice to persons accused of (capital crimes.
"Alabama’s sentencing scheme has yielded some ostensibly surprising statistics," as Justice Sandra Day O’Connor delicately broached the matter in her majority opinion in Harris v. Alabama. "According to the Alabama Prison Project, there have been only 5 cases in which the [trial] judge rejected an advisory [Jury] verdict of death, compared to 47 instances where the judge imposed a death sentence over a jury recommendation of life."
These numbers are more than "ostensibly surprising." They are stunning. Alabama’s trial judges override jury recommendations to spare the lives of convicted murderers almost 10 times as often as they override jury recommendations of death.
And it’s not just a one-state phenomenon. The same pattern holds in the other two states that allow elected judges to override jury sentences in death penalty cases-although it is especially pronounced in Alabama, perhaps because judges there have more discretion and face partisan elections every six years. In Florida, trial judges opted for death in 134, and life in only 51, of the 185 death penalty cases in which they overrode jury sentences between 1972 and. early 1992. In Indiana, the ratio was eight judicial overrides for death to four for life between 1980 and early 1994.
Why are elected judges dramatically more likely than juries to favor executions? After all, the same citizens who elect the judges sit on the juries- except that juries in capital cases, from which death penalty opponents have been systematically removed (for cause) by prosecutors, are likely to be less sympathetic to defendants than the typical voter.