A Step Toward a Jury of One’s Fears
by Stuart Taylor, Jr.
"We have exalted the right of citizens to sit on juries over the rights of the criminal defendant, even though it is the defendant, not the jurors, who faces imprisonment or even death."
Justice Clarence Thomas, who has often condoned unfairness to defendants, has it right this time. His was the most telling point in the fiveopinions generated by the Supreme Court’s unfortunate June 18 decision to bar criminal defendants and their lawyers from talcing account of race in jury selection.
The majority’s bizarre holding in Georgia v. McCollum was that defense lawyers violate prospective jurors’ equal-protection rights-and do so on behalf of the state-when they use their peremptory challenges to strike people they suspect might be less sympathetic to the defendant because of their race.
This does violence both to the fairness of the criminal-justice process and to the integrity of the state-action doctrine. It also, paradoxically, vindicates the symbolic appearance of racial inclusion at the expense of the concrete interest of black defendants in choosing black jurors.
McCollum has been welcomed by some as a logical and benign corollary of the Court’s 1986 decision in Batson v. Kentucky to bar prosecutors from using peremptories to remove blacks from juries.
But the reality is that Justice Harry Blackmun’s majority opinion is a classic example of good intentions gone wrong and step-by-step extensions of legal doctrine gone too far.
The notion of curbing race-based peremptories by defendants may seem momentarily attractive to liberals in the wake of the acquittal of four white Los Angeles cops, who beat black motorist Rodney King, by a Simi Valley jury that included no blacks.